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 1 Introduction1
The ypaper eect denotes an overreaction of local expenditures to varying
transfers from upper-tier governments and it is one of the most explored
subjects in the scal federalism literature.
According to the theory, unconditional grants crowd out local revenues
as only a fraction sticks to the public sector and is spent by the grantee to
buy local public goods, while an equivalent share is expected to ow into
private sector through a reduction in tax rates. This prediction rests upon
the fundamental assumptions that government spending decisions reect
voter preferences, on one hand, and that individuals perceive grant income
and private income to be fungible, on the other. But in the real world grant
revenues have proved to be much more sticky in public budgets than the
theory predicts. This boosted a huge empirical literature, which has also
showed that spending is often more sensitive to increases than to cuts in
transfers.
We are persuaded that testing the relevance of the ypaper eect is
not just a fancy empirical exercise. The overreaction of expenditures to
transfers may be due to politicians aiming at maximising local budgets,
with a greater propensity to spend on public goods than their voters. An
asymmetric response would reveal that grant cuts may not help in curbing
expenditures. This is a potentially relevant matter of concern in Italy, where
scal adjustments are implemented through signicant cuts on transfers to
local authorities.
Despite the increasing role of local decision-making bodies in Italy, only
few attempts have been made so far to understand thoroughly their bud-
getary behaviour and in particular the way in which it is inuenced by State
transfers. Our work seeks to supplement this dearth of evidence by focus-
ing on the responsiveness of expenditures of Italian municipalities to State
grants in the most recent years (1999-06).
There are two distinguishing features of our analysis as compared to
other studies. First, our cross section is much larger (we use data on almost
8.000 municipal balance sheets per year) so that our results are corroborated
by a huge variability in the data. Second, following some recent works in the
political economy literature, we build a broad empirical model which takes
into account not only traditional socio-demographic determinants of local
1We are grateful to the participants of the XXI SIEP Conference in Pavia and of the
50
th SIE Conference in Rome, for useful comments on earlier drafts and to two anonymous
referees. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reect those of the Bank
of Italy.
5expenditures but also political factors (such as electoral cycles, party frag-
mentation, political orientation of local bodies) that may shape the budget
behaviour of municipalities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section de-
scribes the ypaper eect as a puzzle to the traditional theory on inter-
governmental transfers. The third section gives some information about the
Italian setting, describing the changes in the revenue structure of subnational
governments in the last two decades along the path towards decentralisa-
tion. The fourth section is devoted to empirical testing: it opens with an
outline of our empirical strategy, then it describes our dataset, and nally
it discusses our results. The fth section concludes.
2 Theory of intergovernmental transfers and the
ypaper eect
According to the median voter framework, which has represented the bench-
mark for this type of analysis, grants induce income and price eects which
shift local demand for public goods. More specically, unconditional grants
act as lump sum transfers and are thus associated with a pure income eect.
Matching grants have instead a greater stimulatory power as they couple in-
come and substitution eects, the latter stemming from a reduction in public
goods relative prices (see Gramlich, 1977 for an overview). An active area of
research has dealt with the so called ypaper eect, which points to the oc-
currence of an overreaction of local expenditures to unconditional transfers
from upper tiers.
Consider a stylised model with a representative citizen (median voter)
and a policymaker. The median voter's gross private income y, exogenously
given, is allocated to private consumption c and to the payment of local
taxes t. We assume that the scal burden reects individual scal capacity,
expressed by the share hi = yi=y, where y is the average gross income. Hence
(gross) private income can be written as:
yi = ci + ti = ci + hi t (1)
where ci and ti are individual consumption and taxes,  t is the average tax
burden. Policymaker chooses the aggregate level of public services provi-
sion, which is nanced either by local taxes or by upper-tier lump transfers
Z, which are determined exogenously; for simplicity, we assume that sub-
6national governments cannot issue debt2. The aggregate budget constraint
faced by the local ocer can hence be written as:
G = T + Z =
X
i
hi t + Z (2)
Assuming that upper-tier transfers are distributed among individuals











where  z is per capita transfer. The policy maker chooses G (and T) in order
to maximize the median voter's utility function, which is positively aected
by consumption and individual share of public goods gi:
maxW = U(ci;gi) (4)
The individual budget constraint is given by the median voter's full
income (I) which, taking into account (1) and (3), can be written as:
I = (yi + hi z) = ci + gi (5)
In this set up a unit rise in private income would produce a rise in
the consumption of public good equal to gY = (g=I) while a unit rise
in transfers would result in a public good consumption increase of gz =
(g=I)hi (see Inman, 2008).
The impact of lump sum transfers is the one depicted in gure 1a. The
horizontal axis measures public spending G in both money and real terms
(i.e. price is set equal to one), while the vertical axis represents total post-tax
income Y. Local community preferences are exemplied by the indierence
curves of the median voter. The constraint faced by the local decision-maker
in allocating goods between public and private sectors is given by the budget
line AB, whose slope is equal to the individual's local tax share h (i.e. the
relative price of one additional unit of public good out of private income).
An unconditional grant of Z shifts the equilibrium from e1 to e2 (along the
2This assumption is not too restrictive in the Italian framework, where the issue of
local debt is subject to the following limitations: borrowing is allowed only to nance
investment expenditures (golden rule) and is subject to quantitative ceilings in terms of
the ratio of interest expenditures to current revenues (for Provinces and Municipalities) or
to the ratio of amortization instalments to tax revenues (for Regions). Overall, subnational
governments account for a share of roughly 6 per cent of total general government debt.
7EP dotted path), where the community indierence curve is tangent to the
new budget line CD. The change in local expenditures is expected to be less
than the size of the transfer: in the new equilibrium, Y increases along with
G since the lump sum transfer substitutes for local taxes. Thus the standard
prediction of the theory is the `equivalence theorem': from the point of view
of local spending, a unit increase in transfers paid by central government
produces the same eect as an h unit increase in private income (from the
graph, if Y increased by W=hZ units the budget line would in the same
manner shift to CD).
The a priori theoretical equivalence between the stimulative impact of
unconditional transfers and that of private income has been widely disproved
by empirical literature. Since the median voter tax base is generally less than
the average tax base (i.e h < 1), then the ratio gz=gY should be less than
one. However, the empirical research has shown that this is not the case.
The estimates of gz are more than ten times larger than those of gY , as
will be shown in section four. This evidence was labelled by Arthur Okun
the ypaper eect since \money sticks where it hits" (Courant et al., 1979),
meaning that the reallocation of resources between public and private sector
is very rigid and that money is mainly spent by the sector which receives
it rst. Graphically, this implies that - for any possible increase of Z - the
new equilibrium lies along a path as EP
0
, which is located to the right of
the e1e2 line in Figure 1b (where the marginal rate of substitution of G out
of Y is greater than the slope h).
The ypaper eect refers to a strong empirical asymmetry between the
magnitude of the reaction to increases in private income as compared to
lump-sum transfers. A second type of asymmetry which has been found in
the literature is related to the sign of the variation in transfers (cuts versus
increases). Losses in transfers may be partly compensated by local govern-
ments willing to preserve expenditures by raising additional taxes: this is
the \scal replacement" eect observed by Gramlich (1987)3. Alternatively,
local governments may magnify the spending response to cuts in grants by
lowering own revenues as well: this gives rise to the \scal restraint" type of
asymmetry also called super-ypaper eect by Gamkhar and Oates (1996).
In the \scal replacement" case spending is less sensitive to cuts than to
increases in central transfers, while the opposite occurs in the \scal re-
straint"case. For the sake of graphical representation, starting from e2, if
3The scal replacement type of asymmetry as been dubbed as \money sticks where it
hits, but it comes unstuck without leaving a gaping hole" (Gamkhar and Oates, 1996, p.
502).
8the budget line moves from CD to AB the equilibrium path would be like
EP
00
in the scal replacement case (where the marginal rate of substitution
of G out of Y is lower than h, Figure 1c), and like EP
000
in the scal restraint
case (where the marginal rate of substitution of G out of Y is greater than
h, Figure 1d).
But what are the theoretical explanations of the ypaper eect? Bai-
ley and Connolly (1998) assume that standard theory still holds, but under
ideal conditions whose violation gives rise to the ypaper eect. On the
supply side, the crucial assumption of a harmony of interests between the
decision-making body and the community has been questioned by models
showing that agents in the budgeting process (politicians and bureaucrats)
may pursue their own objective functions rather than that of their principal.
On one hand, politicians may use expenditures as a way to feed their clien-
teles and perpetuate their tenure (McGuire, 1975). Similarly, bureaucrats
may aim at maximising their income and other non monetary rewards (such
as perks, status, power, privileges of the oce) which increase monotoni-
cally with the size of the budget (Niskanen, 1968). On the demand side, the
ypaper eect can arise as a consequence of voters' scal illusion (Oates,
1979 and Courant et al. 1979). When spending is nanced by lump sum
transfers, the tax price of services provided by local governments is reduced
on average: when setting their desired level of local public goods, voters
confuse the marginal price of the goods (unaected by the transfer) with
their lower average price and this generates a substitution eect.
Another line of analysis explains the ypaper eect from a totally dier-
ent point of view. According to Hines and Thaler (1995) the overreaction
of local spending may arise as a consequence of behavioural phenomena, as
loss aversion and lack of fungibility between dierent types of funds. If tax-
payers are more sensitive to decreases than to increases in their welfare and
if they do not treat similarly changes in current and in future income, then
it becomes likely that subnational governments are more prone to expand
their budgets with grants than with taxes.
Finally, some authors have interpreted the overreaction of spending to
transfers merely as an econometric artefact, resulting from some kind of
model misspecication. According to Becker (1996) the magnitude of the
ypaper eect could be amplied by the choice of an inappropriate functional
form as well as by the possible endogeneity of grants in spending decisions4.
The empirical results may also be biased by some specication error arising
4Endogeneity problems, for instance, create an upward bias by a factor of almost ten
(Becker, 1996).
9from the nature of the government granting process: grants perceived as
unconditional by the researcher may implicitly include some matching ele-
ments and thus produce a greater stimulatory impact than pure lump sum
transfers.
3 State transfers in the Italian institutional frame-
work
In the Italian institutional framework the subnational sector comprises three
levels of government: Regions, Provinces and Municipalities. Regions are
involved primarily in the provision of health services, Provinces perform
some functions in the areas of road maintenance and natural environment,
while Municipalities are responsible for public illumination, waste disposal,
urban road maintenance, local transports, social aid, childcare and primary
schooling.5
Intergovernmental grants have historically played a signicant role in the
nancing of subnational governments in Italy. Up to the early nineties trans-
fers resulted from yearly negotiations with central government; funds were
mostly earmarked and allocated in such a way to compensate for individ-
ual dierences between past expenditures and own revenues.6 The recursive
link between State transfers and past expenditures weakened local adminis-
trators' budget constraints and generated overspending, contributing to the
deterioration of the overall scal framework.
With the start of the monetary unication process the need for Italy to
engage in budget consolidation became imperative. Decentralisation gained
momentum as an important instrument to achieve scal discipline by the mid
nineties. The nancing system of low-tiers governments was substantially
changed: own taxes boosted while the share of expenditures covered by
intergovernmental transfers gradually declined (Figure 2).7
From the point of view of timing, Municipalities leaded the transforma-
tion of Italian subnational nance. Their revenue structure was reformed in
5The share of subnational expenditures accounted for by each level of government is
roughly two thirds for Regions, and less than thirty per cent for Municipalites.
6This was a consequence of the scal reform of the early seventies, which centralized
most of taxing and collecting powers to the State while suppressing some municipal taxes
(such as the family tax, the consumption tax and the tax upon the value increases of
building areas).
7The work by Darby et al. (2004) shows that attempts for consolidation have brought
substantial changes in lower tiers nancing system in many OECD countries. For a more
detailed description of scal decentralisation in Italy see Franco et al. (2004).
101992, with the assignment of a property tax along with the rationalisation
of transfers from State, which became largely unconditional.8 The criteria
for grant allocation were renewed in order to reect structural parameters
(i.e. demographic, socio-economic and scal indicators) rather than past
expenditures. Further changes occurred in 1997, when some minor revisions
of the allocation criteria were put in place, and in 2001.9
The evolution of municipal tax revenues, primary expenditures and trans-
fers from public governments is depicted in gure 3. The gure is based on
national accounts data, expressed in real terms on a per capita basis. We
can observe a sharp fall of transfers in 1992-1993, which is a composition
eect due to the introduction of the municipal property tax. The trend for
transfers kept on downwards up to 1995, and was then followed by peri-
ods of alternating dynamics: a slight increase from 1996 to 1998, a decline
from 1999 up to 2005, which was temporarily interrupted in 2001 (when
Municipalities were granted a nancial compensation for the abolition of
some minor local taxes) and in 2004, and a strained growth in the last two
years. The evolution of expenditures was similar and apparently sensible
to that of transfers, particularly in the years from 1995 to 2001. A change
seems to have occurred by 2002: expenditures kept on growing, although
transfers were not, and were partly nanced by increases in tax revenues.
The trend inverted in 2004, when expenditures resumed to follow the path
of decreasing transfers; it has to be noticed that from 2003 to 2006 munic-
ipalities were prevented to use some of their scal powers as a way to curb
local expenditures.10
Overall, the aggregate data seem to show anecdotic evidence of a strong
reaction of local expenditures to State transfers up to 2001, and of a some-
what scal replacement behaviour in the two subsequent years. But this
analysis can be misleading and has to be supplemented by an investigation
at the micro level, which is the object of the following section.
8See Decree law n. 504/1992.
9Decree law n. 544/1997 introduced new parameters concerning the extent of service
provision, the presence of military bases and indicators of socio-economic decay and of
scal eort. In application of the nancial law 448/2001, starting with 2002 the annual
amount of transfers to be allocated among municipalities has been set as a proportion of
the receipts from national personal income tax.
10In particular, municipalities were not allowed to increase rates for the local surcharge
on personal income tax (which accounts for a share of roughly 6 per cent of municipal total
tax revenues). It has to be noticed that, for this kind of tax, revenue eects of varying
rates are observed with a one year lag.
114 Testing the ypaper eect
The evidence of the ypaper eect is widespread (Table 1). The literature
has been particularly prolic for the US, favoured by the richness of available
data as well as by a wide use of grants. For that economy the measured rate
of change of expenditures relative to intergovernmental grants gz ranges
from 0.25 (found by Gramlich and Galper, 1973) to more than 1.00 (Case,
Hines, and Rosen, 1993); the corresponding rate of change in individual
income gy is 4 to 6 times smaller. Additional asymmetries in the reaction
to increasing as opposed to decreasing grants seem to be not statistically
relevant according to Gamkhar and Oates (1996).
European economies display even more sensitiveness to variations in
transfers. The ypaper is appreciable for English and Welsh counties (Gem-
mell et al., 2002), while it becomes huge for Norwegian (Tovmo and Falch,
2002) and Flemish municipalities (Heyndels, 2001); in the latter case, asym-
metries with respect to the sign of variations in transfers appear to be sig-
nicant. As for Italy, only a couple of attempts to measure the stimulative
impact of State grants have been made so far. In particular, Levaggi and
Zanola (2003) found evidence of ypaper in regional health expenditures in
the years from 1989 to 1993, with a remarkable asymmetrical eect. More
recently the results by Legrenzi (2009) show a downward inexibility of
both municipal spending and tax revenues in the period 1955-2003, which
could be attributable to some form of budget maximising behaviour of local
bodies.
4.1 Our model
Our empirical strategy is aimed at evaluating the sensitiveness of munici-
pal budgets to transfers by measuring two types of asymmetries: the rst
concerns the magnitude of the reaction to increases in private income as
compared to increases in lump-sum transfers (the standard ypaper eect);
the second type of asymmetry is related to the sign of the variation in trans-
fers (cuts versus increases).
We assume that decision-makers are subject to a revenue constraint and
discretionary set the level of expenditures (and own revenue) in order to
appeal a utility maximising median voter. For the sake of comparison we
follow previous work in the literature, and estimate a reduced form equation
on the expenditure side which can be derived from the analytical framework
outlined in Section 2. In the estimating equation spending is a function


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13economic and institutional determinants of spending. Furthermore, our set
of controls includes, as in Tovmo and Falch (2002) and in Borge et al. (2008),
some political factors that may be relevant in shaping local budgeting deci-
sions.
The basic estimating equation for municipal expenditures is therefore:
Git = 0 + 1Zit + 2Ait + 3Yit + Xit + uit
where Git is the level of total spending, Zit is the level of transfers from the
central government, Yit is the private income, Xit is the vector of controls
and uit is the disturbance term. The variable Ait is introduced to capture a
possible asymmetrical response to transfers, namely:
Ait = Dt(Zt   Zt 1)
where Dt is a dummy equal to 1 when transfers are decreasing and 0 oth-
erwise. A rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetry (i.e. H0 : 2 = 0)
implies that 1 is the expenditure response to increasing grants, while 1+2
is the coecient on declining grants; in this case, 2 < 0 means that we are
in presence of a scal replacement type of asymmetry while 2 > 0 reveals
a super ypaper eect.
4.2 The dataset
In order to test for the ypaper eect we use a panel data of Italian munic-
ipalities in 18 regions covering 8 years (from 1999 to 2006). To cope with
the presence of several outliers in balance-sheet data (some of which are due
to specic events, such as earthquakes or oods, that exceptionally boost
State grants) we trim the rst and the last percentile of capital expendi-
tures11. Overall, our data set consists of 55-60 thousands of observations.
Table 2 reports labels, descriptions, summary statistics and data sources for
the dependent and explanatory variables used in the model.
Dependent variables
We estimate the model considering two dierent dependent variables: Git,
which is the level of per capita total expenditures in each municipality12
and Gcapit which is the level of per capita capital expenditures.13 Our data
11In Section 4.5 we check the robustness of results to the trimming.
12Total expenditures include current and capital outlays but exclude nancial opera-
tions. They include interest expenditures whose incidence is, however, quite low.
13We did not take into consideration sub-items of municipal expenditures as the corre-
sponding data are not completely reliable. As a matter of fact, the classication of local
expenditures into sub-categories is not homogeneous among municipalities.
14source is the Italian Home Oce, which collects nal budget sheets from all
Italian municipalities (and provinces as well) on a yearly basis.
Explanatory variables
Our main regressors in both equations are State transfers and gross income
per capita (tax base). State transfers (Zit) are taken from the Home Oce
balance sheet data set mentioned above and include only current transfers14.
This kind of transfers are totally non-earmarked and are hence uncondi-
tional. Due to the dearth of data at municipal level, we use as a proxy of
the median voter's gross income (Yit) the average personal income tax base
stated in the database on income tax returns of the Revenue Agency.15
Demographic, socio-economic and institutional controls
Following the literature we add to the main regressors a set of conventional
demographic, socio-economic and institutional controls. More precisely, our
demographic controls are composed by the municipality's population size
(POPit, the number of residents) and the ratio of population less than 10
and more than 65 years old (DEPit). We then add also the municipal
surface (SUR, in hectares). Population size and surface could inuence
expenditures since the cost of providing public goods may be subject to
economies of scale; population age may be relevant for public spending,
as services targeted to elderly and to children are expected to cost more.
Following Wicko (1991), we include as a proxy of socio-economic status the
educational level of the community (EDUit), given by the share of residents
with high school education. This should control for the fact that the socio-
economic condition of residents could inuence the possibility of attaining
a given standard in the provision of public services with a lower level of
expenditures as argued by Hamilton (1983) and Oates (1977, 1981). The
data source for socio-demographic variables is the National Statistical Oce.
In our rst set of conventional controls we include three more variables in
order to account for some peculiarities in the public goods production func-
tion or in the budgeting process: the degree of altimetry (ALTit, expressed
as the altitude with respect to the sea level), a dummy variable indicating if
the municipality is also the administrative centre of the province (TY PEit),
and a dummy for municipalities falling into `special status' regions (STATit).
These are regions which enjoy a greater degree of decentralisation from the
14Current transfers include proper State current transfers and the proportion of national
personal income tax assigned to municipalities by nancial law 448/2001.
15Another variable to be considered would be debt, although the simplied model pre-
sented in Section 2 does not account for debt nancing. Unfortunately data for local debt
at the micro-level are not currently available.
15point of view of the function performed, and hence their budgets are over-
sized with respect to `ordinary' regions; municipalities belonging to these
regions somewhat share this peculiarity and exhibit higher than average
level of expenditures.
Political controls
A second set of controls is a distinguishing feature of our data set. Pub-
lic nance has become deeply entrenched with political economy, once it
has been widely acknowledged that the budgeting process arises from a
principal-agent relationship. A number of studies has dealt with how ob-
served spending and taxation choices are inuenced by politics (see Besley
and Case, 1995, for a notable example). We thus add some controls for the
political factors that may shape local budgets, namely: a variable represent-
ing the position of each municipality along the political cycle (CY CLEit
computed at each time t as the time span to the following council election),
a dummy representing the possibility for the mayor to be re-elected in the
following election (TERMit, equal to 1 if the mayor is at the second term
and thus cannot be re-elected), an index of compactness of the governing
coalition (COMPit, which is an Herndal index of the share of each party
sitting in local councils), and a dummy for the political orientation of local
bodies (POLit, taking a value of 1 for centre-right governments) for the
common wisdom that right wing governments tend to spend less than left
wing ones. We also introduce the interaction factor CYCLE*TERM. All
other things being equal, if politicians tend to maximise their probability
of being re-elected, CYCLE is expected to have a negative eect on spend-
ing like the variable TERM, but the magnitude of the negative relationship
between time distance to the elections and spending could be damped by
a binding term limit. The degree of homogeneity in the political structure
may also matter: Tovmo and Falch (2002) and Borge et al. (2008) argue
that the strength of political leadership is negatively related to the size of
local budgets, since a weak government would be more prone to bargaining
and more reluctant to cut spending, as it would nd it dicult to resist
to pressures from local interest groups; if their argument is right COMP
should have a negative sign in our regressions. All our political variables











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































174.3 Some econometric issues
The estimation of the model is potentially aected by some relevant econo-
metric problems. A rst issue is the possible endogeneity of the variable
representing transfers from central government. Transfers to municipalities
could be set simultaneously with local expenditures, and this would cause
an endogeneity problem which should be treated properly in order to get
consistent parameter estimates. But, as pointed out in Section 3, this seems
not to be the case. Since 1992 new allocative criteria for State transfers
were introduced, hence, if at all, their distribution follows the setting of lo-
cal expenditures at that date; furthermore, from 2002 the amount of State
transfers is set as a proportion of the receipt from national personal income
tax. Hence we can reasonably assume that reverse causation from expendi-
tures to transfers is not at work.
A second estimation issue, as pointed out by some authors (Bailey and
Connolly, 1998; Becker, 1996), is represented by the possible presence of
omitted variables which, if correlated with regressors, lead to inconsistent
estimates. To help solving this problem the inclusion of a large set of controls
may sometimes be the right choice but in many cases it is not sucient. To
test whether this issue is relevant in our case we performed an Hausman
test comparing random-eect estimates of the model, which are consistent
only if there are not omitted variables correlated with regressors, and xed-
eect estimates, which are consistent in both cases, under the assumption
that non-modeled heterogeneity can be considered time invariant. Results
are reported in table 3. The model for per capita total expenditures was
estimated with xed and random eects using the whole set of controls and
with panel-robust standard errors. Since the RE estimation is likely to be
non-fully ecient, we could not adopt the standard version of the Hausman
test. We thus boostrapped the coecient dierence and tested its overall
signicance (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 and 2009). The evidence led
us to accept the null hypothesis. Individual eects can then be considered
uncorrelated with regressors and RE estimator can be used. We can thus
obtain the estimation of all coecients, including those of time invariant
variables, exploiting both cross sectional and time variation. As a matter
of fact the use of FE estimation wipes out a relevant piece of information,
which is given by the variability across municipalities, to exploit only the
variability along the time dimension. In what follows, for completeness, we
will present xed eect estimates as well.
18Table 3: Hausman test
Replications = 400
Variable Coe. di. Bootst. S.E. z P > jzj
Z 0.084 0.087 0.96 0.336
ASYMMETRY -0.078 0.045 -1.74 0.082
Y -0.003 0.005 -0.55 0.580
POP 4.317 5.203 0.83 0.407
DEP -4.742 3.807 -1.25 0.213
CYCLE -0.001 0.001 -0.54 0.592
COMP 0.153 0.066 2.32 0.021
POL 1.666 2.683 0.62 0.535
TERM -2.633 3.448 -0.76 0.445




We estimated a model for per capita total expenditures with dierent spec-
ications (table 4). In column 1 and 2 we present results for both xed and
random eect (RE) estimation with all control variables described in the
previous section. In column 3 we added time dummies to RE estimates16
while in columns 4 and 5 we present results splitting the sample according to
the population size of municipalities (over and under 5000 citizens). In col-
umn 6 the model is estimated with RE and with time and spatial dummies,
represented by provinces.
Results show that the sensitivity of total municipal spending to varia-
tions in personal income ranges from 0.04 to 0.06 in the full sample, similar
to the GDP response of Flemish municipalities in Heyndels (2001). The
range is amplied if we consider local size: the coecient is 0.07 for munic-
ipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants and 0.03 for larger ones. If we add
spatial dummies the magnitude decreases to 0.02. The stimulative impact of
transfers, around 1.3/1.4, is instead higher than the one obtained by Heyn-
dels and more comparable with what is obtained by Tovmo and Falch (2002)
for Norwegian municipalities. The eect is more pronounced for smaller mu-
nicipalities although the pure ypaper eect, i.e. the asymmetry between
16Time dummies can be useful to capture possible changes in expenditures due, for
instance, to dierent regimes with respect to the possibility of modifying local tax rates.
19the coecient on transfers and that on income, seems less. The coecient
on asymmetry is signicant and has a negative sign, thus revealing a scal
replacement type of asymmetry i.e. municipalities react to declining trans-
fers by increasing own revenues. As to demographic controls, there are signs
of economies of scale with respect to population only for small municipal-
ities; in this case, there is also a positive association between surface and
per capita expenditures. Local spending is in all specications positively
inuenced by the age structure of population as municipalities deal with the
provision of many social services to children and to old-age people (whose
costs are higher). The socio-economic status of the community, proxied by
the educational level, is signicant with a positive sign. This could be ex-
plained by the fact that education may boost the demand for local cultural
services, such as exhibitions, museums, theatres and libraries17, while the
cost reducing eect described by Hamilton (1983, see Section 4.2) is probably
negligible. As to the other conventional controls, altitude is, as expected, a
factor which increases spending as a consequence of higher costs of provision
for local public goods; the institutional dummy on regions is also relevant,
since expenditure level for municipalities falling in special status regions is
higher, reecting the peculiarities of the functions they perform. Munici-
palities which act as administrative centres do not show, instead, signicant
higher costs.
Results for political variables give interesting insights. First, we note that
local spending is undoubtedly subject to electoral cycles, since expenditures
soar as administrative elections approach and if the mayor is at the rst term.
The sign of the interaction term between CYCLE and TERM indicates that
the negative eect of the political cycle is, however, mitigated when the
mayor cannot be re-elected. The political compactness of local bodies is
also relevant, but the sign is unexpectedly positive. Here the argument
seems reversed to the one made by Tovmo and Falch (2002): the more
cohesive majorities are, the easier they spend, while political fragmentation
hinders spending decisions. Actually, political fragmentation can be the
expression of some sort of heterogeneity in municipal community and this
can make spending decisions more dicult: this is the justication given for
example by Heyndels (2001) for introducing a measure of income dispersion
in an analogous model of local expenditures. Finally, there isn't any clear
and unique evidence of a dierence in the spending behaviour of centre-
right governments with respect to left wing ones. Time dummies, where
17See Dalle Nogare and Galizzi, 2009, for an analysis of cultural expenditures of Italian
municipalities.
20introduced, are signicant for all years apart for 2000 and have a similar
coecient for two groups: 2001-02 and 2006 on one side and 2003-05 on the
other side.
We also looked at the behaviour of per capita municipal capital expen-
ditures. In table 5 we present the model estimated with both random and
xed eects (column 1 and 2), with RE and time dummies (column 3) and
with RE, time dummies and space dummies (column 4). The evidence sug-
gests that the reaction to current transfers as well as to per capita income
is about one-third of the one shown by total expenditures; the sensitivity
to personal income is between 10 and 30 per cent. Municipal surface is sig-
nicant and negative, which could be explained by economies of scale. The
dependency ratio still has a positive impact as well as the educational level
of the community. Political variables COMP and CYCLE have the same
sign, size and signicancy of the models for total expenditures while politi-
cal orientation does not play any role. The impossibility for the mayor to be
re-elected lowers per capita capital expenditures and mitigates the adverse
eect of the electoral cycle as in the model for total expenditures.
Overall, the evidence shows the presence for Italian municipalities of
strong ypaper and scal replacement eects. These eects are present even
controlling for a wide range of factors, from demography to socioeconomic
conditions as well as political features. The magnitude of the ypaper is
indeed not altered by the introduction of political factors. The coecient
estimates (not reported here for space limits) of the model with only socio-
demographic controls are equal to 1.49 for transfers and 0.07 for income.
Therefore, on the basis of this evidence, the ypaper eect seems not to be
fully ascribed to a misalignment between local policy makers and population
and thus the explanation is probably due also to other phenomena, like scal
illusion or loss aversion and lack of fungibility, as outlined in Section 2.
4.5 Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of our results we performed two other types
of estimation. In the rst one we pooled all observations together and we
estimated with OLS using the same set of observations of the RE model.
In the second estimation we applied the least absolute deviations (LAD)
estimator in the original dataset without trimming the rst and the last
percentile.18
18As in the RE-ii, we added a set of time dummies to account for a trend whose coe-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Results (table 6) are mostly in line with those obtained with the panel
data RE model. The magnitude of the asymmetric term is denitely higher
but the estimated coecients of transfers and income have all the same sign,
signicance and magnitude of the ones in table 4 and 5. As to controls and
political variables, results are mostly in line with panel data estimates apart
from the coecient of surface variable and those of political compactness
and orientation.
5 Concluding remarks
The ypaper eect is one of the most popular and documented subjects in
the scal federalism literature. Despite a widespread success overseas, in
Italy little empirical research has been done on this matter. Our work has
started to ll this gap, by investigating the extent to which spending deci-
sions by municipal governments are inuenced by changes in their revenue
structure. Results have highlighted a remarkable standard ypaper eect
and strong evidence of an asymmetrical response with respect to the sign of
variations in transfers. Conventional demographic, social and institutional
controls have mostly the expected sign. Altitude is a factor which increases
expenditures associated with a given level of output while municipal ex-
penditures grow as population becomes older, reecting the need for more
expensive services.
Politics is conrmed to play a crucial role in local budgeting processes:
data unambiguously show that local spending is subject to electoral cycles
and that compact majorities are more prodigal. But the presence of the
ypaper eect is not fully explained by political variables, also demand side
factors - like scal illusion - or behavioural phenomena are likely to play a
role.
24Table 6: Robustness check
Estimator OLS LAD OLS LAD
Variable Git Git Gcapit Gcapit
Z 1.467*** 1.204*** 0.545*** 0.453***
(11.92) (15.21) (6.65) (9.51)
ASIMMETRY -0.868*** -1.117*** -0.406** -0.211
(-2.64) (-4.39) (-2.35) (-1.55)
Y 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.004 0.006***
(11.05) (12.22) (1.57) (5.10)
STAT 742.378*** 539.071*** 363.569*** 257.213***
(24.50) (22.04) (17.86) (16.58)
ALT 0.895*** 0.514*** 0.542*** 0.313***
(17.76) (16.82) (21.62) (17.90)
TYPE -67.678 5.819 -34.730 -15.364
(-1.31) (0.12) (-1.09) (-0.66)
POP 0.324 0.226 0.331 0.061
(1.09) (0.54) (1.36) (0.30)
SUR 1.703 4.116*** -3.297** 0.624
(0.86) (3.78) (-2.41) (0.88)
DEP 18.974*** 13.821*** 12.339*** 5.970***
(11.27) (14.33) (11.21) (10.75)
EDU 8.489*** 6.351*** 3.823*** 2.256***
(6.02) (7.24) (4.08) (4.38)
CYCLE -0.097*** -0.077*** -0.091*** -0.067***
(-10.13) (-14.24) (-11.78 (-16.46)
COMP 1.304*** 0.242 1.297*** 0.569***
(5.68) (1.48) (7.87) (6.34)
POL 3.897 -12.777 5.762 2.150
(0.29) (-1.63) (0.58) (0.43)
TERM -35.630 -27.396** -30.835* -19.228**
(-1.59) (-2.14) (-1.77) (-2.09)
TERM*CYCLE 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.028***
(3.87) (4.98) (4.28) (4.43)
Intercept -616.787 -199.687*** -278.156*** -111.279***
(-9.90) (-5.87) (-7.09) (-5.31)
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28Lump-sum transfers and local expenditure  
Fig. 1a: traditional theory 
 





























29Fig 1c: fiscal replacement 
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